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FERTILITY DECLINE AND
PROJECTED FERTILITY CHANGES
The postwar peak of fertility was reached in 1957. Since that date, the
total fertility rate has declined, at first only gradually, but in the past
few years quite substantially. At the same time, per capita real dis-
posable income, a commonly used index of economic conditions in
correlations with fertility, has continued to rise at an average rate only
slightly lower than previously. Does this mean that economic factors
have had little to do with the recent fertility decline? Does it raise
doubts about the explanation offered in Chapter 4 for the baby boom?
While a thorough investigation of these questions is not attempted
here, it is possible to determine whether in recent years economic
factors have changed in at least a direction conducive to fertility de-
cline, and to consider the implications for recent fertility projections.
As in Chapter 4, the focus is on those in the earlier childbearing ages.
No attempt is made to subdivide the population further into color-
nativity or other component groups, a decision partly justified by in-
creasing homogeneity of the population [124], but chiefly by expedi-
ency. The more limited time span under study makes it possible to base
the present analysis largely on the invaluable population and labor
force surveys of the past two decades, which provide fairly continuous
data heretofore unavailable on the economic experience and demo-
graphic behavior of component groups in the population. In keeping
with our interest in the longer-term movement rather than year-to-
year fluctuations, these data have been smoothed, where possible, by
a three-year moving average. For the most part, attention will center
on comparisons between the period of the baby boom and that of the
current fertility decline. Since it is only after World War II that most
of the series become available annually, I have linked them with a112 /II:FERTILITY ANALYSES
prewar observation, usually for 1940, to fill out the picture for the
earlier period.
In one respect, this analysis develops further the framework of
Chapter 4. The analytical focus there was on the rate of change in
fertility, thus making it possible to largely set aside considerations
regarding the secular trend. This chapter, however, deals directly with
the level of fertility; and, while not attempting a study of the long-
term primary trend itself, does introduce one factor believed relevant
to it, namely, the desired consumption level of those in early child-
bearing ages.
FERTILITY AND YOUNG ADULTS
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE 1940
Fertility
The fertility pattern since 1940 will be lightly touched on only,
since it is more than adequately treated elsewhere [201]. Figure 30
presents three-year moving averages of the total fertility rate and age-
specific birth rates for females over the period 1940—63. Only a few
observations require mention.
1. The increase from 1940—42 to the peak in the late 1950's is much
greater for the age groups 15—19 through 25—29 than for the older ones.
Indeed, together the three youngest age groups account for most of
the rise in the total. If the rates for no other groups had changed, the
rise to the 1957—59 peak in the total fertility rate would have been 44
per cent. This compares with an actual increase of 53 per cent.
2. Although there is no systematic difference between the younger
and older age groups in the decline since 1957—59, the younger groups
again account for most of the movement in the total (—4.3 versus
—5.7 per cent, actual).
3. Within the younger age groups, there is a systematic difference
by age in the recent decline. It occurs first and is greatest for those
aged 15—19, followed by the 20—24, and finally, the 25—29. The peak
for the 15—19 group occurs in 1956—58, ahead of that in the total, and
the decline to 1961—63 is 12 per cent; for those aged 25—29, the peak
is stretched out over 1957—61, and the decline to 1961—63 totals 3 per
cent.
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The income data assembled here are chiefly from the Current
Population Survey and accordingly follow the concepts used therein,'
Since nonmonetary income is omitted from the Survey, the position of
farmers is somewhat understated. Use is made here of the figures both
for income of persons, i.e., income recipients alone, and for families,
including individuals both with and without income. The figures have
been adjusted to a constant price level by the consumer price index.
These are the principal impressions which emerge from inspection
of the charts:
1. As previously noted, per capita disposable income, a commonly
used index of economic conditions in correlations with fertility, con-
tinues to grow throughout the last decade or so, though at a somewhat
lower rate than in the 1940's (Figure 31). If one considers all age
1DorothyS. Brady and F. Gerard Adams have recently prepared comparable
by age for 1941 (221, thus providing an invaluable prewar bench mark.
I am grateful for the opportunity to use a prepublication version of these estimates.
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FIGURE 33
TOTAL MONEY INcoME 1959 DOLLARSFAMILIES, BY AGE OF HEAD AND




groups 14 and over combined, the same is true of the median income
of male income recipients (Figure 82) and, for the somewhat shorter
span for which data are available, the median income of all families
(Figure 33, Part A).
2. Investigation of income experience by age makes clear that the
aggregative movement in recent years isnotrepresentative of the
experience of the younger age groups. This has typically been less
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FIGURE 34
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, BY SEX AND
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in the timing and extent of departure from the general movement are
reminiscent of the pattern for fertility—the adverse departure is earlier
and greater for the younger group. Thus Part A of Figure 33 (the
figure presenting income information most immediately relevant to
fertility behavior) shows that the median income of families with head
aged 14—24 declined for several years after 1956—58, and by 1961—63
had recovered only to a slightly higher level than the 1956—58 peak.
For those with head aged 25—34, median family income in this period
continued to grow, but a gradual divergence from the aggregate move-
ment becomes apparent after 1958—60.
3. As shown in Figure 34, the movement in unemployment rates
by age supports the impression that in recent years the experience of
younger groups has increasingly diverged in an unfavorable direction
from the average.
4. Within the younger age groups, disparate movements are
apparent in recent years between the lower and higher income seg-
ments. The poorest fifth of each younger age group has had less favor-
able income experience than the group average (Figure 33, Parts B
and C). Indeed, for the lowest fifth of the households with head aged
14—24, income has actually declined noticeably since 1956—58.
5. In the 1940's, in contrast, the age pattern of income and unem-
ployment changes was the opposite of that which has recently de-
veloped. Income of younger age groups grew substantially more
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proportion receiving income in these groups rose sharply, while relative
income per recipient remained virtually constant (Figures 82 and 35).
Similarly unemployment rates of younger persons converged
sharply toward the average (Figure 34). Finally, within the younger
groups the lowest income segments experienced more rapid growth
[22].
6. Since the economic situation of a family depends on more than
its current income, other pertinent measures may be noted, though the
information is more fragmentary and (for the measures noted in the
second and third paragraphs below) of lower reliability.
Veteran status entails access to certain benefits and credit re-
sources. For males aged 20—24, the proportion of veterans in civilian
life rose to almost two-fifths in 1950; by the mid-1950's it had dropped
to somewhat over one-fifth; and, by 1961—63, to almost zero (Figure
36). Roughly similar movements are apparent for those aged 25—29
and 30—34, but at a higher level and with a lag.
Housing conditions are sometimes considered relevant to fertility
behavior. For nonfann families in which the head was aged 18—24 or
FIGURE 35 FIGURE 36
MALE MONEY INCOME RECIPIENTS VETERANS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
AS A PERCENTAGE OF MALE POPULA- MALE POPULATION, BY ACE, 1940,
TION, BY AGE, 1941 AND 1947—63 a 1945,1950, AND 1955—63 a
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SOURCE: Through1940,from census reports; 1949—59,from FederalReserve
Bulletin, September1959, p. 1107, Supplementary Table 1; December 1962, from
Ibid.,March 1964, p.292; 1960, January—February1962,and 1963, from George
Katona et al, Surveyof Consumer Finances, 1960, pp.60—61, 1962, p. 89, 1963, p. 90.
'Includes farmfamilies.
25—34,thepercentage owning their own homes rose markedly between
1940 and 1949 (Table 3). Since that date, for those with head aged
18—24 the proportion has tended to drop off; 2forthose with head
aged 25—34, it continued to rise noticeably through 1954, but there-
after edged up only slightly.
Between 1953 and 1962, the median net worth (in current dollars)
of all spending units rose, but for those with head aged 18—24 or 25—
34, it declined (Table 4). As a percentage of income, the adverse
movement in the net worth position of younger persons is even more
marked. Among all spending units, the proportion with net worth
equal to or greater than one-half annual income decreases from 83 to
59 per cent; for those with head aged 18—24, the decrease is from 21
to 15 per cent, and with head aged 25—34, from 52 to 37 per cent.
Marriage, Household Formation, and Wives'
Labor Force Participation
In the interpretation of the baby boom in Chapter 4, fertility was
but one of several demographic variables markedly affected by the
2Thelow value for January—February 1962 isnot supported by two subsequent
surveystaken within twelve months of thatdate,andis most likelydue to
samplingvariability.
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Chapter 4, fertility was
arkedly affected by the
exceptional economic situation.Itispertinent,therefore,to see
whether these other variables have changed recently in a direction
consistent with the earlier interpretation.
To turn, first, to marriage behavior, for the age groups under 25,
the proportion ever-married rose sharply in the 1940's, leveled off in the
1950's, and, in recent years, shows evidence of a decline (Figure 37).
As would be expected, for females this pattern is more pronounced at
somewhat lower ages than for males. For the age groups over 25,
following an initial rise, a leveling off is apparent but as yet there is
no indication of a decline.
TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING UNITS
Age of Head
14 and Over 18—24 25—34
Net Worth














1,000—4,999 23 21 22 23 33 34
5,000—9,999 17 15 3 3 16 11
10,000—24,999 18 20 1 1 12 10
25,000 and over 11 14 1 1 4 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100






Zero or negative 16 17 25 33 19 25
1—49 21 24 54 52 29 38
50—99 1! 13 13 9 16 16
100—199 15 15 6 3 17 12
200—499 20 17 1 1 15 6
500 and over 17 14 1 2 4 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Themovement in household formation, shown in Figure 38, tends
to lag behind that in marital status. For males aged 14—24 and 25—29, 40 -
whilethere is no indication in recent years of a continuation of the
earlier upsurge in the proportion heading husband-wife households, 30 -
neitheris there evidence as yet of a marked decline, although a slight
20- downturnis perhaps indicated.
After increasing in the 1940's, the labor force participation rates
10
of young wives tended to level off in the first half of the 1950's
(Figure 39, Part B). More recently, however, they have started to 0 —
1940
climb again, so noticeably that the latest labor force projections em-
Sou
body a significant revision for this group. Two considerations suggest aTITHE CURRENT FERTILITY DECLINE / 121
that the circumstances responsible for the recent rise differ from those
BY SEX ANDAGE, underlying the earlier. In the 1940's unemployment rates for young
females were declining; in the recent period, the increase in labor
Females forceparticipation has occurred in the face of rising unemployment
rates (Part A). Second, in the earlier period the rates for wives with
young children grew somewhat less than those for married women as
90 a whole; in the recent period the rates for wives with young children
80 are chiefly responsible for the upward movement for the group as a
whole (Parts C and D). These observations suggest that, while the
70 rise in labor force participation of young wives in the 1940's was in-
duced by the increasing tightness of the labor market as a whole—both
60 for younger men and women—in the 1950's it arose from a deterioration
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B. LaborForceParticipationRate,
Married Females with Husband Present,
by Age, 1940, 1948—64 a
C. LaborForceParticipationRate,
Married Females with Husband Present,
with Children under 6 and No Child
6—17, 1940, 1950, and 1948—84'
D. Labor ForceParticipationRate,
Married Females with Husband Present,
with Child under 6, by Age, Selected
Years, 1940—63
FIGURE 39
UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF FEMALES, BY
MARITAL, CHILD DEPENDENCY, AND AGE CLASSES
Percent
A. Unemployment Rate of Females, by
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In the discussion of income above, the concern was with the
absolute level, and the implied hypothesis was that fertility varies
directly with the absolute income level, other things being equal. One
ON RATES OF FEMALES, BY
AGE CLASSES
ployment Rate of Females, by
1947—64"
FIGURE 40
NEW HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES NOT ENROLLED IN COLLEGE,a BY
SEX, MARITAL STATUS, AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN OCTOBER OF







which made it increasingly difficult for husbands to support a family
and correspondingly created pressures for increasing participation by
their wives.
For the last few years, insight into the experience of a somewhat
more homogeneous segment of the younger population—new high
school graduates who did not go on to college—is provided by recent
surveys of their employment status four months after graduation
(Figure 40). Although the size of the group is small and sampling
variability consequently greater, there is a striking rise in the employ-
ment and labor force figures for married females in this group; a find-
ing at a more microscopic level consistent with the view just expressed.
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of the considerations included in the ceteri.s paribus assumption is the
consumption level desired by the husband and wife. It is generally
recognized that in considering the potential uses of additional income,
a rise in the per capita stock of consumer goods available to husband
and wife is an alternative to expanding the size of the family [14, 45].
Holding income constant, one would expect that fertility would vary
inversely with the desired consumption level.
But do desired consumption levels change, and if so, why? This
question involves us in complex conceptual issues in the economics of
consumer preferences. There is an understandable reluctance among
economists to explain changes in behavior in terms of changes in
"tastes," which are typically taken as given. There is, however, one
generally accepted proposition of immediate relevance: If one of two
families with equal current income previously received higher income
than at present, that family would be expected to spend more on
consumption [51, In other words, experience with previous
higher income levelsalters "tastes" and thereby consumption be-
havior.
This line of reasoning may be transferred with some modification
to the present problem. Young persons currently in the childbearing
ages a few years before were dependent members of their parents'
households, and it seems plausible that the consumption levels ex-
perienced in the parents' households among other things served to
shape their current preferences in much the same way a previous
higher income level would affect those of a given household. Moreover,
the situation in the parents' household when the children were in their
teens would seem more relevant than when the children were quite
young.
If this is so, an interesting implication follows. In a developing
economy the second generation's income at age 20—24 istypically
greater than the first generation's was at that age. The second genera-
tion could thus achieve the consumption level the first generation had
at age 20—24 and have something left over for other purposes, such as
saving or increased family size. But if the desired consumption level
inherited by children from their parents relates to the parents' situation
3Thepioneering contribution on the "relative income" hypothesis is Dorothy S.
Brady and Rose D. Friedman [22a].
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not at age 20—24 but at, say, 35—44, then it is less certain that the sec-
ond generation's income at 20—24 will suffice to achieve the desired
consumption level. In other words, there is an intergenerational effect
tending to increase consumption at a given income level. Clearly by
varying the parameters involved one could develop alternative models
in which secular growth in absolute income was accompanied by in-
creasing, decreasing, or constant fertility.
Given the purpose and scope of the present report, it is scarcely
appropriate to pursue this suggestion regarding the secular trend at
this point.4 Two brief points may, however, be added. First, while the
above clearly does not imply that such a model would suffice to explain
the secular trend, it obviously bears on the oft-raised question of how
to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the secular inverse
(gross) association between income and fertility, on the one hand, and
the shotter-term positive association, on the other. Second, it suggests
that in an analysis of the secular trend the actual income of those in
childbearing ages should be sharply distinguished from the factors
behind the formation of their preference patterns. Under the latter
heading would be included not only parents' income, but variables
such as religion, nativity, and one currently the subject of increasing
attention, farm-nonf arm origin.5
If sufficient historical data were available on income, tangible
assets, and consumption expenditure by age, it would be possible to
investigate various relations between parents' and children's incomes,
and consider their bearing on fertility behavior. Unfortunately, the
necessary information is scarce, and an attempt is made here only to
present two largely illustrative analyses.
1. Column 2 of Table 5 shows the median income of families with
head aged 14—24, the series plotted in index form in Figure 33. Column
4 gives the income five years earlier of families with head aged 35—44,
presumably, the households in which most of those in column 2 were
Note should be made, however, of recent major contributions on secular fer-
tility trends by Kingsley Davis [48] and Ronald Freedman [671.
See Otis Dudley Duncan [51a], and citations of earlier work'by Goldberg and
Freedman given therein. I have explored more fully these and other conceptual
issues raised in this Part in a recent paper "Towards a Socio-Economic Theory of
Fertility," which appeared in Fertility andFamilyPlanning: A World View, a col-
lection of papers prepared for the University of Michigan sesquicentennial celebra-
tion, November 15—17, 1987.126 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
TABLE 5. TOTAL MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES
WITH HEAD AGED 14-24 COMPARED WITH
THAT RECEIVED BY FAMILIES WITH HEAD
AGED 35-44 FIVE YEARS EARLIER, 1953-62
(Income figures are in 1959 dollars and are
three-year averages centered at indicated date.)
Head Aged 14—24 Head Aged 35—44 Col. 2 ÷
• Col.4
Year Income Year Income Per Cent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1953 3,405 1948 4,199 81.1
1954 3,496 1949 4,221 82.8
1955 3,701 1950 4,343 85.2
1956 3,912 1951 4,570 85.6
1957 3,981 1952 4,787 83.2
1958 3,916 1953 4,950 79.1
1959 3,887 1954 5,152 75.4
1960 3,984 1955 5,389 73.9
1961 4,068 1956 5,627 72.3
1962 4,077 1957 5,762 70.8
SOURCE: Same as for Table D-4.
living at that time.° Thus, column 2 is the actual income of young
families; column 4, an indicator of the desired consumption level
inherited by them from their parents' households. (Clearly some ad-
justment in the level of column 4 would improve it as a consumption
indicator, but our present interest is ultimately in the change rather
than level of the .series.) Column 5 of Table 5 presents the ratio of
the two. In terms of the present framework this shows, e.g., that in
1953, on the average, young households were receiving incomes equal
to about four-fifths of what their parents received five years ago. As
was previously observed, and is shown here in column 2, absolute
income leveled off for this age group around 1956—58. What is sug-
gested by column 5, however, is that relative to desired consumption,
income has been falling since about 1955—57 for this age group, a
development which would clearly serve to create greater downward
pressure on fertility.
6Itwould be desirable to experiment with lags of varying length as well as. to
identify more precisely the relevant parent cohort, but longer time series and
greater age detail are needed for a thorough investigation.
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1929 12,210 1947 8,650 1953 9,210
1933 11,060 1948 8,690 1954 9,400
1939 9,580 1949 8,660 1955 9,780
1945 8,240 1950 8,840 1956 10,020
1945 8,410 1951 8,920 1957 10,110
1946 8,470 1952 9,040 1958 10,200
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ired consumption level
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SOURCE: For net tangible assets of nonfarm households, Raymond W. Goldsmith,
The National Wealth of the United States in the Postwar Period, Princeton, 1962, p.
203. For number of nonfarm households, Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports: Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 92. The two entries for 1945
arise from differing estimates of net assets, the first comparable to the pre-1945
values; the second, to the post-1945 values.
2. Table 6 is an attempt to develop a rough impression of the
longer-term movement in desired consumption levels since 1929. The
table shows the value in constant dollars of tangible assets per non-
farm household after allowance for Ideally, it would
be desirable to have such information by age of household head. If,
failing this, one takes the movement in the average as likely to be
broadly indicative of the changing situation of the age group 35—44,
then the series can be used to infer differences among successive
younger cohorts in inherited consumption desires. Thus from 1929
through the late 1940's assets per household for all age groups, and
presumably for those with head aged 35—44, declined and then leveled
off. This suggests that the cohorts reaching childbearing age and
establishing separate households toward the end of this period had
been raised in less materially prosperous home environments than
those reaching childbearing age earlier in the period and consequently
had lower desired consumption levels. Indeed, the cohorts reaching
childbearing age, say 15—19, when asset levels were lowest, roughly
The figures comprise largely homes and consumer durables, whether owned
or rented. Particularly prior to the postwar period the former dominates the total,
so that the series might be viewed as a crude index of housing conditions, with
the depreciation adjustment providing an allowance for age of housing.128 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
in the decade 1940—50, include those that figured most prominently in
the baby boom. Since the late 1940's average assets per household
have moved up noticeably, which would imply that the most recent
cohorts are reaching childbearing age with desired consumption levels
significantly above those of their predecessors.8
Summary and Qualifications
Let us summarize the general impression emerging from this
survey of the evidence, keeping in mind its preliminary nature. In
recent years young persons' income has grown only hesitantly and their
unemployment rates have risen. The situation has been most severe
among the lowest-income segments of these groups. Home ownership
has become less prevalent among households with head aged 18—24,
although it has continued to edge up slightly for those 25—34. In both
groups, however, net worth position has declined, suggesting heavier
pressure of liabilities. Moreover, most of the special benefits associated
with war veteran status are no longer available. The labor force par-
ticipation of young wives with dependent children has risen noticeably,
suggesting increasing economic stress on the family. Finally, the young
cohorts of recent years have come from wealthier backgrounds than
their predecessors in the 1940's, and in all likelihood are entering the
childbearing ages with the more expensive tastes for consumer goods
thereby acquired.
These developments contrast strikingly with the unusually favor-
able economic circumstances of young adults in the decade or so prior
to the mid-1950's. They are consistent with the hypothesis that eco-
nomic factors have been, at least in part, responsible, first, in the early
postwar period for the abrupt declines in age at marriage and house-
T
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hold formation and the associated rise in fertility, and second, for the
more recent slowdown and gradual reversal of these demographic
movements.
This conclusion, however, must be tempered by explicit recognition
of the various shortcomings of the present analysis. While I have been
able in this study—thanks to the new and growing fund of survey data
since World War Il—to probe perhaps more deeply into relevant eco-
nomic circumstances than has typically been done in the past, no
attempt has been made to assess the extent to which the quantitative
magnitude of the fertility decline might be explained by economic
factors. Further, separate examination would be desirable of various
component groups in the population, for example, farm, nonwhite, and,
as data become available, different socioeconomic classes. Study is
needed also of the older groups in childbearing ages, even though
their quantitative importance in the over-all period rates has not been
great. Finally, an effort should be made at a cohort approach, though
this is currently handicapped by the varying ways in which age detail
is presented in the source materials.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FERTILITY PROJECTIONS
Period Rates
In view of the limited scope of the present analysis and manifest
needs for further research, one may doubt the advisability of raising
the question of prospective fertility changes. The justification for doing
so arises from recognition that the use of economic factors in fertility
projections is itself a pressing research problem. The current consensus
is aptly stated by two of the authors of the recent census projections:
"It is sometimes suggested that a considerable improvement in our
projections of births could be achieved if account were taken of the
relation between changes in fertility and economic changes. Our tenta-
tive view is that this approach is hardly feasible and that it may not
achieve the end desired" [143].
Chapter 4 indicated that the postwar baby boom could be recon-
cued with longer-term historical experience; this chapter suggests that
the recent shift from baby boom to fertility decline is consistent with
the earlier interpretation. In both papers, economic factors were con-
sidered fundamental to fertility changes. Clearly, the implications of
- I130 / II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
this viewpoint for the use of studies of economic factors in projections
would be of interest, even though the discussion must necessarily be
exploratory. Moreover, such a discussion might serve further to illus-
trate the framework and highlight research needs. What follows there-
fore is frankly speculative and is offered not as a prediction but for
whatever value it may have in furthering research in this area.
The admirably detailed population projections recently released
by the Bureau of the Census provide the point of departure [144].
These present not forecasts but the implications of alternative assump-
tions regarding the future course of the components of population
change, particularly fertility. The framework thus provided for reflec-
tion about prospective developments is extremely valuable. For the
foreseeable future, the potential contribution of the present approach
would seem to lie not in supplanting such a framework, but in apprais-
ing the relative plausibility of the various assumptions and perhaps
suggesting new possibilities. Thus, with reference to Figure 41, which
shows the four series of projected fertility rates through 1975,° the
pertinent question would be: Which, if any, of the projected paths is
more consistent with the present analysis?
At the heart of the present explanation of postwar fertility move-
ments are differences in income growth by age. Ideally, in looking to
the future one would want projections of income by age based on a
tested theory of the determinants of this distribution. Although there
is no such theory available, the framework of Chapter 4 embodies a
view, speculative though it may be, regarding these determinants; and
we may perhaps utilize this to form some crude notion of prospective
income trends for young adults compared to others. In this conception,
the swing in the relative income position of young adults since 1940
has been chiefly due to corresponding swings from relatively favorable
to unfavorable positions in three factors—aggregate demand, and the
relative quantity and quality of younger persons. The first part of the
period was characterized by high growth of aggregate demand asso-
ciated with the war and early postwar boom, a relative shortage of
young workers, and an unusual educational advantage of young over
old; the second part, by slackened growth in aggregate demand, sub-
9Foreach date from 1965 on the points plotted refer, from top to bottom,
to projections A, B, C, and D, respectively.
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aPer1,000femalepopulation in specified agegroup.
b Computedby summing age-specific rates for each five-year agegroupthrough
40—44 andmultiplying the result by 5. The result is thecompletedfertilityrate that
wouldariseifahypothetical cohort experienced theage-specific rates of the given
date in thecourse ofitsreproductive history.
C Totallivebirths divided byfemalepopulationaged15 to44.
dTotallivebirths divided by totalpopulation ofall ages.
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stantial growth in the relative number of younger persons, and de-
terioration in their educational advantage. Regarding the outlook over
the next decade, the projections of educational attainment imply some
additional decline in the relative advantage of younger persons in high
school, though not college education (Figure 42). As for relative
FIGURE 42
PERCENTAGE OF THOSE ACED 25—29
30—64 WITH SPECIFIED YEARS OF SCHOOL
COMPLETED: ACTUAL, DECENNIALLY, 1920—
60;PROJECTED, QUINQUENNIALLY, 1965—85
A. AtLeast 9, but Not More than 12 Years
Per cent
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quantity, the growth rate of those aged 15-19, which has been rising
for over a decade, will start to taper off in the next ten-year period,
but that for the two succeeding age groups will be cresting (Figure
43). These considerations tend, if anything, to suggest some possible
further deterioration in the relative income position of younger per-
sons. On the other hand, it is possible (though by no means certain)
that aggregate demand growth will be higher than in the recent past
and the relative income position of younger persons will be con-
sequently helped through an improvement in their relative employ-
ment situation. As shown in Table 7, however, the decline in relative
income position of young adults in the recent past has noticeably ex-134 /II: FERTILITY ANALYSES
TABLE 7. INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THOSE AGED 14-24
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SOURCE: Col. 1, same as for Table D-4; Co1. 2, [202, March 1965, p. 205, Table
A-12, and p. 222, Table B-8].
aIncompletecycle.
ceeded what might have been expected as a result of the greater
growth in unemployment among this group. Hence, under prospective
supply conditions, even restoration of the earlier more favorable em-
ployment situation would probably only moderate the adverse relative
income condition that has developed for young adults.
Altogether, the outlook for the next decade suggested by these
considerations is that the relative income position of younger persons
may show some further decline and then a leveling off, perhaps
followed by a slight rise. As among the several age groups, those aged
15—19, which are furthest along with regard to the adverse impact
of numbers on the labor market, might be expected to lead in this
movement, with those aged 25—29 lagging behind. With regard to
fertility rates for these age groups, one might correspondingly infer
some further decline followed by a leveling off. Of the projections
shown in Figure 41, this would suggest that series C and D are more
consistent with the present analysis. As between the two, there is little
to choose through 1975, but the tendency of series C to level off seems
somewhat more in line with the suggested income movements. Since,
as we have indicated, the movements in the age-specific rates for those
under 30 typically dominate the movement in the summary measures
for all ages, one might f
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for all ages, one might further infer that the total fertility rate would
continue to decline between 1965 and 1970 and then level off (Figure
41). The substantial positive effect on fertility of prospective age
composition shifts over this period is shown by the movements in
the general fertility rate and crude birth rate. The latter would actually
"bottom out" in 1965—70 and show a noticeable rise in 1970—75.
Completed Fertility
To this point the discussion has been concerned entirely with
"period rates" of fertility, that is, measures of reproductive performance
during a given chronological period. Important research by P. K.
Wheipton and his colleagues in the postwar period has brought to
the forefront a new set of fertility measures, namely, "cohort rates,"
in which the basic unit of study is not a chronological period but a
population cohort, typically a group of women born in a given
year(s). Thus a cohort fertility measure describes the reproductive
history of the group up to a specified age. The "completed fertility
rate" is a cohort measure showing the total number of live births
per woman (or per thousand women), on the average, over the entire
reproductive period of the cohort. For cohorts currently completing
childbearing this is in the neighborhood of 3.0 births per woman,
It has been stressed that variations in period rates do not neces-
sarily imply variations in completed fertility rates, since the former
are also influenced by changes in the spacing of childbearing. For
example, during much of the period of the baby boom (a period
rate phenomenon at the time) it was often pointed out that the boom
did not necessarily imply a rise in completed fertility (though this
has in fact subsequently proved to be the case). Correspondingly,
it might be asked whether the recent and prospective decline in
period rates portends a decline in completed size of family?
A satisfactory answer to this calls for explaining the age-specific
rates for the groups aged 30 and over, which is not attempted here.1°
However, just as the rates for ages under 30 dominate the summary
period rates, so cumulative births for a cohort through age 29 corn-
bArecentpaper by Arthur A. Campbell provides a concise review of the post-
war fertility experience from the cohort viewpoint [28]. Campbell suggests that
the recent fertility decline at older ages is due to a change in spacing.136 / II: FEBTILITY ANALYSES
prise a large share of the cohort's completed fertility. For example,
if the cohort of 1945—50, which will be aged 15—19 in 1965, were to
show the relevant age-specific rates of the Census C projections as it
aged to 25—29 in 1975, it would have had an average of 2.1 live
births per woman by that age. Clearly, the present speculation regard
ingthe outlook through 1975 for age-specific rates up to ages 25—29
carries this cohort through the main part of its reproductive period.
If this cohort were to maintain the spacing pattern used in all the
Census projections (which is to say if it were to continue on the C
track through the remainder of its reproductive career), its completed
fertility would be 2.8 births, well below the roughly 3.3 peak now
anticipated for the cohort of 1930—35 (Table 8, column 4).
Is a movement like this toward lower completed fertility likely
to occur, or is a major change in child-spacing toward later age in
prospect? While significant shifts in child-spacing have occurred in
past experience, most notably toward earlier childbearing in the past
two decades, there is nevertheless a high positive correlation between
cumulative fertility through age 29 and completed fertility. Presumably
this is but one indication that by age 30 the life cycle pattern of most
individuals has been well established. While some shift toward later
childbearing seems possible, one may speculate that with the con-
tinued growth in the educational level of females and in opportunities
for them in productive employment a major reversal toward later
childbearing isunlikely to occur. On these (admittedly tenuous)
grounds, I venture the guess that the current movements in period
fertility do imply a reduction in completed fertility.
Recent surveys show that expectations regarding completed family
size for cohorts currently entering the childbearing period do not
differ significantly from those of cohorts further along [68]. These
results appear to contradict the suggestion made here of an incipient
decline in completed fertility, and to imply that the recent decline in
fertility among younger persons involves merely postponement of
births which will be made up at later ages. However, a suggestion
is put forward by the authors of the survey report, and some support-
ing evidence noted, that postponement of births may be a first step
toward revising expectations downward. If correct, this would recon-
cile the expectations results with my speculation.
However, it is not entirely clear that the survey results are In
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TABLE 8. PROJECTED AND EXPECTED NUMBER OF BIRTHS PER










'62'63'64 A BC D
Cohort (1) (2) (3)(4) (5) (6) (7)(8)(9)(10)
1920—2540—44 2.9 2.9 1921—253.0n.a.n.a.na.
1925—3035—393.2 3.1 3.1 1926—303.33.13.23.2
1930—3530—343.5 3.4 3.3 1931—353.43.33.33.5
1935—4025—293.5 3.4 3.2 1936—423,13.23.23.2
1940—4520—243.5 3.3 3.0 1939—45n.a.n.a.3,1
1945—5015—193.4 3.22.8 2.7
1950—5510—143.4 3.12.8 2.5
1955—60 5—93.4 3.12.8 2.4
NOTE: (1) Cohorts below dotted line are those affected by projections for 1965
through 1975 of age specific rates for 15—19, 20—24, and 25—29. (2) Except for the
youngest cohort, the expectation data refer only to those members of each cohort
who would have been eligible for the 1960 GAF study. There is, therefore, an up-
ward selection with respect to duration of marRage as these cohorts age.
SOURCE: Cols. 1—5, [144, Table A-i]; cols. 7—10, [68, Tables 3 and 7]. Unpublished
1964 survey data were provided by Ronald Freedman.
'Birth cohort of 1940—46.
n.a. =notavailable.
conflict with my view. In Table 8 the expectations of various cohorts
reported in the survey have been matched with the census projections.
If one reads columns 7 through 10 vertically, one finds a consistent
picture of a rise in completed family size through the cohort of
1931—35, followed by a gradual decline for the two subsequent co-
horts.11 The close correspondence of the Census C and D projections
with this pattern, not only in movement but in magnitude as well,
is not exactly surprising since the projections utilized the surveys
through 1962. The point is, however, that my analysis based on
economic considerations, which relates to the cohorts below the break
in the series, independently suggested the Census C series as the most
plausible, and this is the one consistent with the expectations results.
11 The original draft of the chapter was based on the 1960, 1962, and 1963
surveys. Subsequently, Ronald Freedman kindly supplied comparable 1964 data,
which proved to show the same pattern of intercohort differences as the three
previou.s surveys.r
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The apparent contradiction between the survey results and my
suggestion of a prospective decline in completed fertility thus stems
from the fact that the size of the sample does not permit attributing pART III /
statisticalsignificanceto the decline indicated by the survey results,
rather than the absence of such a decline. Some reassurance about
the reliability of the differences in expectations for adjacent cohorts
might perhaps be drawn from the fact that all four surveys indicate
a larger completed rate for the 1931—35 cohort than for the 1926—30
cohort, and a smaller rate for the 1936—42 cohort than for the 1931—35
cohort, though the magnitude of the differences vary. Clearly what
is needed, however, is an increase in sample size to permit finer
judgments about statistically significant differences. In this connection,
it would seem desirable to strive in addition for separate observations
for the 15—19 group. The cohort of 1945—50 will reach this age in 1965
and the Census C series implies a further noticeable decline in the
completed rate for this group. The current survey procedures, however,
would not provide a reading on this group until it is 20—24.
Conclusions on Projections
The application of the cohort approach has resulted in significantly
improved population projections in recent years. Surveys of fertility
expectations are of value both in the development of new projections
and in appraising existing ones, as well as in analyzing ongoing
fertility changes. The present discussion of economic factors suggests
that such an analysis may play a role in projections work similar to
that performed by the expectations surveys. If my analysis is correct,
each projection series implies a pattern of income change by age. To
the extent this pattern can be made more explicit (perhaps tying in,
for example, with recent work on income by age at HEW {22])
the more feasible it becomes to appraise the "realism" of individual
projections, in much the same way as knowledge of the completed
fertility rate implied by different projections helps in evaluating them.
It hardly needs to be stressed that this is a goal, and that much
more basic research is needed, including of course attention to dif-
ferences among population components. The complementary use of
expectations surveys and studies of economic factors, illustrated in
this discussion, is an attractive possibility for the longer run. 